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KSR v. TELEFLEX: HOW 
“OBVIOUSNESS” HAS CHANGED 
DANIEL BECKER* 
A patent is invalid on obviousness grounds when the “differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which the subject matter pertains.”1 In KSR International 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme Court unanimously 
held that a court may find a patent invalid as obvious3 absent a 
specific finding that some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” 
(TSM) existed that would direct an inventor to combine elements of 
prior art in the same way as the patentee did in the challenged 
patent.4 The Court held that the proper inquiry focuses on the 
objective reach of the claim, not the “particular motivation nor the 
avowed purpose of the patentee.”5 Despite past criticism for 
disregarding Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the proper test 
for obviousness,6 the Federal Circuit seems to have followed the 
direction provided in KSR v. Teleflex in the months after the decision 
was handed down on April 30, 2007. Indeed, comparing the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion7 from which KSR v. Teleflex arose with the court’s 
opinions soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex 
reveals that the Federal Circuit is in fact applying its “TSM” test much 
more broadly, making it easier for an infringement defendant to 
invalidate a patent based on obviousness. 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. §103(a). 
 2. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004). 
 4. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. 
 5. Id. at 1741, 1742. 
 6. Brief for Petitioner at 30, KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 
04-1350), 2006 WL 2515631 (“commentators describe the Federal Circuit as having ‘neatly 
abolished,’ ‘ignored,’ and ‘dismiss[ed]’ Supreme Court precedent”). 
 7. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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I. Background of the Case 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.8 began in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan as a patent 
infringement suit between two automobile-parts manufacturers.9 At 
the time of the original suit, Teleflex was the exclusive licensee of the 
“Engelgau” patent,10 which disclosed a particular type of adjustable 
pedal assembly used in automobiles.11 Because the key issue in this 
case was whether the Engelgau patent represented an obvious 
combination of prior art, a brief discussion of prior art in the field is 
necessary. 
A. The Prior Art 
In its most basic form, the gas pedal of an automobile can be 
depressed or released to control the rate at which gasoline and air 
enter the engine, but its resting location in the footwell cannot be 
adjusted.12 This limitation created problems for small drivers who 
owned cars with deep footwells.13 In the 1970s, inventors began to 
develop pedal assemblies with pedals that could be adjusted within 
the footwell.14 Two such designs are important in this case. The 
“Asano” patent15 discloses “a support structure that houses the pedal 
so that even when the pedal location is adjusted relative to the driver, 
one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed.”16 The Asano pedal 
assembly also is designed so that no matter where the pedal sits 
within the footwell, the force required to depress it remains constant.17 
The “Redding” patent18 discloses an adjustable pedal assembly in 
which the pedals and their pivot points move when the driver adjusts 
the pedal position within the footwell.19 
The gas pedal of an automobile—whether adjustable or not—can 
interact with the throttle in one of two ways: either by a mechanical 
 
 8. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
 9. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 10. U.S. Patent No. 6,109,241 (filed January 26, 1999). 
 11. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1727, 1737. 
 12. Id. at 1735. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1999). 
 16. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. Patent No. 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993). 
 19. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735. 
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link such as a cable or by a computer that detects the gas pedal’s 
position and transmits that data to the throttle.20 In the 1990s, more 
cars were being equipped with computer-controlled throttles, and it 
became necessary to design compatible pedal assemblies.21 Several 
pedal-assembly designs were patented in the early 1990s that 
integrated electronic sensors to detect the pedal’s position and 
transmit the data to a computer-controlled throttle.22 For example, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (the ’936 patent)23 revealed an assembly with 
an electronic position sensor located in the pedal assembly itself, 
rather than in the engine.24 Another patent—the “Smith” patent25—
taught that the electronic sensor should be mounted in a fixed 
location, rather than in the footpad, to prevent the wires connecting it 
to the engine from damage caused by the driver’s foot and chafing 
because of movement.26 Additionally, U.S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (the 
’068 patent)27 provided an entirely different solution to the electronic-
sensor problem. The ’068 patent revealed a self-contained “modular” 
electronic sensor that could be taken off the shelf and attached to a 
mechanical pedal assembly, making that assembly compatible with a 
computer-controlled throttle.28 
Not surprisingly, by 1995 at least one patent existed that 
integrated electronic position sensors and an adjustable pedal 
assembly. The “Rixon” patent29 revealed an adjustable pedal assembly 
with an electronic sensor mounted in the footpad of each pedal.30 The 
wires connecting the electronic sensors to the computer-controlled 
throttle in this design, however, were known to chafe as a result of the 
pedal arm’s constant movement.31 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. U.S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (filed Sept. 9, 1991). 
 24. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735. 
 25. U.S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (filed July 9, 1990). 
 26. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 27. U.S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (filed Dec. 18, 1992). 
 28. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 29. U.S. Patent No. 5,819,593 (filed Aug. 17, 1995) 
 30. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736. 
 31. Id. 
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B. The Engelgau Patent32 
Teleflex held the exclusive license to the Engelgau patent at the 
time this action was commenced.33 Claim four of the Engelgau patent 
disclosed “a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic 
pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal 
assembly,” which “allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position 
while the driver adjusts the pedal.”34 The specification of the Engelgau 
patent reveals that it was intended to be a “simplified vehicle control 
pedal assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and 
is easier to package within the vehicle.”35 
C. The Controversy 
KSR was hired by General Motors Corporation (GMC) in 2000 to 
“supply adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks 
that used engines with computer-controlled throttles.”36 To meet 
GMC’s needs, KSR simply added a modular electronic sensor to an 
adjustable pedal assembly that it previously had been supplying to 
Ford for use in automobiles with mechanical throttles.37 Teleflex 
notified KSR that it believed “‘any supplier of a product that 
combines an adjustable pedal with an electronic throttle control 
necessarily employs technology covered by one or more’ of Teleflex’s 
patents.”38 After KSR refused to enter into a royalty agreement with 
Teleflex, Teleflex sued for infringement of the Engelgau patent.39 KSR 
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Engelgau patent was 
invalid because “it would have been obvious to someone with 
ordinary skill in the art of designing pedal systems to combine an 
adjustable pedal system with an electronic pedal position sensor to 
work with electronically controlled engines increasingly being used in 
motor vehicles.”40 
 
 32. U.S. Patent No. 6,109,241 (filed January 26, 1999). 
 33. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1737. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (quoting Teleflex v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585 (E.D. Mich. 2003)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Teleflex v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 585. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of KSR.41 
The court began its analysis with the four-part inquiry first articulated 
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,42 which states that 
whether an invention is obvious is a question of law based on an 
examination of “(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the 
level of ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the prior 
art and the claimed invention; and (4) the extent of any objective 
indicia of non-obviousness.”43 
The district court found that the Asano patent revealed relevant 
prior art and that it taught each of the limitations in claim four of the 
Engelgau patent except “those relating to an electronic pedal position 
sensor.”44 The court also noted that prior art such as the ’068 patent 
disclosed electronic position sensors, similar to the one used in claim 
four of the Engelgau patent.45 All parties agreed that a person having 
ordinary skill in the art would have an undergraduate mechanical 
engineering degree, or the equivalent amount of industry experience, 
and familiarity with various types of pedal control systems.46 
The district court observed that: 
[t]he fact that Asano and the modular pedal position sensors teach 
the invention disclosed in claim 4 does not render their 
combination obvious, however, unless there is ’some motivation or 
suggestion to combine the prior art teachings,’ either in the prior 
art itself, or by reasonable inference from the nature of the 
problem, or from the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the 
art.47 
The district court found such a “suggestion” in the Rixon patent. 
The pedal assembly disclosed by the Rixon patent included an 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 43. Teleflex. v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 587. 
 44. Id. at 592. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 590. 
 47. Id. at 593 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(finding that “the suggestion to combine requirement stands as a critical safeguard against 
hindsight analysis and rote application of the legal test for obviousness”); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. 
v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (determining that “[o]bviousness 
cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed 
invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination”)). 
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electronic position sensor mounted in the pedal arm, and the frequent 
motion of the pedal arm was known to cause chafing of the wires that 
connected the electronic sensor to the internal computer.48 The district 
court concluded that it would have been obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to mount the modular electronic position 
sensor disclosed in ’068 on the fixed pivot section of the Asano pedal 
assembly in order to avoid the chafing problems associated with the 
Rixon design.49 Based on this conclusion, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of KSR, and Teleflex appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.50 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON APPEAL 
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.51 The court observed that “the best defense against the 
subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness 
analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the 
teaching or motivation to combine prior art references.”52 Proceeding 
on this premise, the court held that the district court erred because it 
had “applied an incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation test.”53 
More specifically, the court held that the district court had not 
articulated “finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle 
within the knowledge of a skilled artisan” that would have led 
someone to combine the teachings of ’068 and Asano in the way that 
Engelgau had.54 
The Federal Circuit further held that the suggestion or motivation 
was not implied by the nature of the prior art in this case, as the 
district court had found it was, because the prior art that the Engelgau 
patent combined was not designed to address the same problem.55 
Specifically, the purpose of the Engelgau patent “was to design a 
smaller, less complex, and less expensive electronic pedal assembly.”56 
The Asano patent, in contrast, was designed to address the constant-
 
 48. Id. at 594. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x 282, 283 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 288. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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ratio problem,57 and the Rixon patent was not designed to address the 
problem of wire chafing, but rather suffered from it.58 The court held 
that although the Smith patent taught that the wires attached to the 
electronic position sensor must not move with the pedal, this “does 
not necessarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic 
control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly,” and in any 
case, “the Smith patent does not relate to adjustable pedal 
assemblies.”59 
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that an invention cannot be 
proven obvious merely by showing that the particular combination of 
prior art embodied by the invention might have been “obvious to 
try.”60 Rather, the court held, a finding of obviousness must be 
supported by a specific finding that an inventor with no knowledge of 
the invention in question would have been motivated to combine the 
prior art in exactly the same manner as the invention.61 
In sum, the Federal Circuit affirmed its long-standing, self-created 
TSM standard, which, in its view, “requires a court to make specific 
findings showing a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 
prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed.”62 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari63 to address the question “whether the 
Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed invention cannot 
be held ‘obvious,’ and thus unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in 
the absence of some proven ‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ that 
would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the 
relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.”64 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Federal Circuit, holding that by applying the TSM test in such a strict 
 
 57. The constant-ratio problem refers to the problem of designing a pedal assembly such 
that the force necessary to depress each pedal remains constant regardless of the pedal’s resting 
position within the footwell. Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x at 288. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 288–89. 
 60. Id. at 290 (“’Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute obviousness.”) 
(quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 61. Id. at 289. 
 62. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
 63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) 
(No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463. 
 64. Id. 
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manner, the Federal Circuit had “analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid 
manner inconsistent with [35 U.S.C.] § 103 and our precedents.”65 The 
Court pointed out three errors of law made by the Federal Circuit, 
and articulated the correct standard for each.66 
First, the Court concluded that a patent can be invalid for 
obviousness if “there existed at the time of invention a known 
problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the 
patent’s claims.”67 The Federal Circuit erred by limiting this inquiry 
“only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve.”68 The correct 
standard, the Court held, is that a patent may be obvious if its subject 
matter represents the obvious solution to any problem known within 
the field, regardless of whether it was the problem the patentee was 
aiming to solve.69 In this case, although the Engelgau patent was 
aimed at providing a simpler, less expensive pedal assembly,70 it 
nonetheless represented the obvious solution to a well-known 
problem: integrating an electronic position sensor and an adjustable 
pedal assembly in such a way as to avoid wire chafing problems.71 
Second, the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that an inventor 
aiming to solve a problem “will be led only to those elements of prior 
art designed to solve the same problem.”72 This holding repudiated the 
Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the requisite “teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation” could not be implied by the nature of the problem in 
this case because the prior art was designed to address different 
problems than Engelgau.73 The fact that Asano was designed to solve 
the constant-ratio problem, the Court said, had little relevance 
because another of its key features was a fixed pivot point—precisely 
where other prior art such as the Smith and Rixon patents had taught 
was an ideal mount for an electronic position sensor.74 The Court 
observed that “[t]he idea that a designer hoping to make an 
adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was 
designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little sense. A 
 
 65. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 66. Id. at 1742. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1736. 
 71. Id. at 1744–45. 
 72. Id. at 1742. 
 73. Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 74. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
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person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an 
automaton.”75 
Finally, the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that proof that a 
particular combination would have been “obvious to try” is never 
sufficient to establish obviousness.76 To the contrary, the Court noted 
that in an industry faced with a problem for which there are “a finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions,” a person attempting to 
solve that problem will likely first try “the known options within his 
or her technical grasp.”77 If a solution is found this way, the Court 
observed, “it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary 
skill and common sense,” and thus may be found obvious despite 
merely being “obvious to try.”78 
This three-pronged repudiation of the Federal Circuit’s strict 
application of the TSM test certainly appeared to be a turning point 
for the concept of obviousness.79 However, the Federal Circuit has a 
history of disregarding Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.80 
Thus, immediately following the Court’s opinion there was 
uncertainty regarding whether and how the Federal Circuit would 
follow it. 
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SINCE KSR V. TELEFLEX 
In the first five months after the decision, it became clear that the 
Federal Circuit had indeed changed its approach to the obviousness 
inquiry. As one expert noted, “[t]he KSR Supreme Court decision has 
completely revamped the Federal Circuit’s thinking on 
nonobviousness.”81 Another expert predicted that the decision would 
affect the types of patents that are challenged and the outcome of 
those challenges, especially in the pharmaceutical industry: 
I believe that you will see generic pharmaceutical companies be 
more aggressive in challenging the validity of patents owned by 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Commentary of Michael Barclay, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, as posted by 
Gretchen Sund to SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/some-thoughts-about-ksr-
v-teleflex-the-marketplace-test-for-obviousness (Apr. 30, 2007) (“This decision makes it far 
easier to invalidate patents based on obviousness.”). 
 80. See supra note 6. 
 81. E-mail from Maxim H. Waldbaum, Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP, to Daniel W.J. Becker 
(Sept. 17, 2007, 14:51 EST) (on file with author). 
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brand pharmaceutical companies, especially those patents relating 
to extended-release formulations or certain methods of use. With 
many extended-release formulations, there is typically a finite 
number of ways to achieve the extended-release of the active 
ingredient, and there is almost always market pressure to develop 
a drug formulation that can be taken once or twice a day, as 
opposed to every few hours. Under those circumstances, it would 
likely be obvious to try the known methods to achieve extended-
release, and the results would often be predictable. When that is 
the case, KSR would suggest that a patent on the extended-release 
formulation would be invalid for obviousness.82 
Indeed, roughly ten days after the Supreme Court handed down 
KSR v. Teleflex, the Federal Circuit held that a patent owned by 
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. (“Leapfrog”), a manufacturer of children’s 
toys, was invalid as obvious.83 Leapfrog owned a patent (the ’861 
patent)84 for an electronic learning device whereby a child could press 
a button or switch associated with a letter, and the speakers within the 
device would emit the sound associated with that letter.85 Leapfrog 
sued Fisher-Price, Inc., alleging that their “PowerTouch” device 
infringed the ’861 patent.86 The Federal Circuit upheld the decision of 
the district court, finding that Leapfrog’s patent was invalid as 
obvious because it simply took one element of prior art—a 
mechanical version of the device87—and upgraded it with modern 
electronics, which the court found to be “commonly available and 
understood in the art.”88 
Not once in the opinion did the Federal Circuit revert to its 
recently-repudiated TSM test.89 Rather, the court sang a decidedly 
different tune when addressing the issue of obviousness: “An 
obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula 
dissociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the 
common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some 
 
 82. E-mail from Chad A. Landmon, Partner, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, to Daniel 
W.J. Becker (Sept. 27, 2007, 17:07 EST) (on file with author). 
 83. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed Cir. 2007). 
 84. U.S. Patent No. 5,813,861 (filed June 20, 1997). 
 85. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1158. 
 86. Id. 
 87. U.S. Patent No. 3,748,748 (filed Dec. 1, 1971) (the “Bevan” device). 
 88. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162. 
 89. See generally Leapfrog, 485 F.3d 1157. 
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combinations would have been obvious where others would not.”90 
The Federal Circuit applied the approach outlined in KSR in at least 
eight other cases between May 2007 and October 2007.91 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It appears clear that KSR v. Teleflex represents a dramatic change 
in the concept of obviousness, although the magnitude of this change, 
in large part, remains to be seen. One expert has predicted that many 
changes will occur within the Patent and Trademark Office, with more 
patents being denied on initial examination or invalidated upon 
reexamination.92 Whether this prophecy will prove accurate in the 
long run, however, is not immediately clear. Perhaps the practical 
impact of KSR v. Teleflex is best described by another expert, who 
stated that “a patentee can no longer count on the Federal Circuit for 
any support on both issues of validity and infringement . . . . [W]e are 
back to 1982, with the stakes much higher and the nonuniformity, fear 
level, and security factor for all parties embarrassingly undefined.”93 
 
 
 90. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1161 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 
(2007) (emphasis added). 
 91. See Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007); PharmaStem Therapeutics, 
Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Omegaflex, Inc. v. Parker-Hannafin Corp., 
243 F. App’x 592 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Trans Tex. 
Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Metropolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494 
F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto, Co., 231 F. App’x. 954 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 92. See Jay Sandvos, Bromberg & Sunstein LLP, Expert Analysis: How KSR v. Teleflex 
Should Change Your Patent Strategies, ELECTRONICS DESIGN, STRATEGY, NEWS, May 16, 2007, 
http://www.edn.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleid=CA6442383. 
 93. Waldbaum, supra note 81. 
